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When a call is requested in a circuit switched network, a call set-up or connection
admission process tests paths across the network determined by its routing algorithm
for congestion and assigns the call to the first path which is uncongested. Routing
algorithms are used to establish the appropriate routing paths or the equivalent
routing table entries in each node along a path. Most algorithms are based on
assigning a cost measure to each link in the network and determining the linear sum
of paths across the network [1]. Based on these costs, the network tries to allocate
traffic  to the cheapest paths across the network. Where the cost function is based on
link congestion (real or predicted) the cheapest path may change over time to
maintain the network level efficiency of the call admission policy. However, such
mechanisms are limited by their lack of information about the wider network state.
Put simply, a connection admission process cannot determine the most efficient path
from the network point of view merely by checking a small number of paths for
congestion. The usage of the links in a path may be equal in two otherwise different
network states and the most efficient routing decision from the network point of view
would be different in each case. To rectify this situation, we propose a network
management framework in which the effects of routing decisions in one part of the
network are felt across the entire network, and in which node level decision-making
takes place in the presence of some (limited) information about the network level
state of congestion. Our approach is to model the telecommunications network
resources as trading entities and goods in a computational economy. Although our
investigation into this approach is still at the proof of concept stage, we show in this
paper that a market-based mechanism is able to successfully route calls through a
network over time, although not yet as efficiently as a conventional static routing
mechanism. In this paper we discuss the relative performance of the two mechanisms
under a variety of network loading conditions and the possible reasons for the under
performance of the market-based approach.
One of the main strengths of a market-based approach is that it provides a
framework in which the various network components can be owned by different,
competitive, real-world enterprises. Thus resource allocation takes place against the
assumption of competition, rather than cooperation between the components. - this
theme is discussed in section 2. In section 3 we describe the choices that were made
in specifying the system architecture and the institutional structure of the market and
how these follow from the system level properties we want to achieve. Section 4
describes the design of the individual agents. Section 5 discusses experiments
devised to measure the performance of the market-based routing mechanism in a
small simulated network under conditions of low, medium and high loading. In
section 6 we compare and contrast our approach to that of others who have used
market-based mechanisms for network control problems. Finally section 7 describes
the open issues and future work.buy and sell resources, act so as to maximise their profit from ongoing transactions.
Gode & Sunder [6] have shown that under certain conditions double auction type
markets have the property of generating efficient allocation of resources among zero
intelligence agents (i.e. those that do not reason with historical information to
predict prices). This result led us to experiment with a relatively simple agent design
to determine if routing decisions could be generated by a market mechanism in
which agents used pricing functions based solely on endowments and the last known
clearing price of their respective markets.
4.1 Link Agents
Link agents can be thought of as the producers of natural resources in the economy.
As producers, they wish to maximise the income they derive by selling network
resources to path agents. They do this by offering to sell at a relatively low cost when
demand is low (in order to continue to acquire contracts) and competition between
path agents is less, and at a higher price when demand is high (in order to exploit
the greater competition among buyers). The price at which link agents offer
resources is set in the following manner:
Let A be the set of link agents, and let a ∈  A be a specific link agent. Each link
agent (a) has a set of resources (Ra) which it can sell in the link market - in this case
a unitary resource is sufficient (bandwidth) to carry one call across the link which
that agent represents. Ra is composed of n equal bandwidth slices {rai, …ran} which
are allocated sequentially from the beginning.
Thus if rap (1 ≤  p ≤  n) is the next free resource then p-1 have already been allocated.
After allocating rap, a will have n - p free resources. a’s pricing function P for the
next free resource is given by the following formula:
 P(rap) = e
( p / n) (1)
This function was chosen so that once resources begin to be allocated on a link, the
price rises quickly. This means that the marginal cost of obtaining the next resource
(when the network is loaded) will be greater than that of obtaining the last.
4.2 Path Agents
Path agents act as both buyers of link resources and sellers of path resources. We
detail their buying behaviour in section 4.2.1 and their selling behaviour in section
4.2.2. In general, however, path agents wish to buy resources cheaply from the link
agents, and sell them on at a profit to the end-consumers. To do this, they bid
competitively to acquire resources, which they then sell on to callers at a price not
less than that paid for them. As a secondary factor the agent attempts to sell as manyKuwabara, et al. [8] and in the domain of job sharing among networked computers
by Chavez, Moukas & Maes [9]. Considerable work remains to be done in assessing
the lag time of information passing around the system and the impact of this on
allocative efficiency.
6 Related Work
Other authors have applied market-based control mechanisms to network control
problems. Most notably Kuwabara, Ishida et al who have investigated an
equilbratory approach (in which the market calculates the supply and demand
volume equilibrium) to the allocation of resources in an ATM telecommunications
network [8]. Our approach differs from theirs in that we ultimately wanted to explore
the idea of having the resources needed to make a call across the network ready to be
traded at the market at call set up time, thereby avoiding call set up overheads. This
led us to treating each call as requiring a unique set of resources and therefore a
departure from allocating resources according to a calculated demand-volume
equilibrium. Wellman has also described an architecture in which different types of
agents internalise the costs of a distributed multi-commodity flow problem by buying
and selling resources at prices which reflect the cost to the network of routing traffic
through shared links using local information [10]. Wellman’s approach yields a
balanced flow for the equilibrium state of the network in which the flows across each
route are balanced by the market mechanism as predicted by network theory.
However, in the domain we wished to investigate (a circuit switched network) each
call is discrete and therefore could not be allocated to a number of routes
simultaneously (bifurcated routing) as would be required to achieve equilibrium
flows across competing routes.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
These preliminary results show the ability of a market-based mechanism to generate
paths across a network and allocate calls to them dynamically in an environment in
which network resources are owned by a number of different real world entities and
therefore co-operation in network management domain cannot be taken for granted.
Experimental investigation of the efficiency of this mechanism shows that this
technique is most likely to be beneficial when the network is heavily loaded.
Our analysis of the results so far indicates that a more thorough treatment of the
relationship between competitive pressures and market efficiency may lead to higher
allocative efficiency in the market, and therefore smoother load balancing in the
system. Therefore we intend to review how the pricing strategies of the agents are
designed and the complexity of the functions required to achieve competitiveness. If
the objective were to design the agents for profitability in harsher economicconditions than those simulated here (in our system callers continue to meet the
prices asked by path agents no matter how high they inflate) much could be done to
make the path agents more aggressive traders. For example, they could be given the
ability to reason about the market over time to adjust their strategies accordingly. An
alternative approach which we intend to investigate which makes use of speculating
agents to stabilize markets has been shown to provide a worthwhile improvement in
allocative efficiency [11].
Another interesting area for future research is the possibility that the market
mechanism may allow for the resources needed to make calls to be allocated
proactively. This would provide an advantage over conventional call set up /
connection admission proceedures in that it may be possible to overcome the problem
of call set up delay affecting the efficiency of the decision taken. The call set up
properties of market-based and conventional routing mechanisms will be
investigated in future work.
This work takes place within the wider context of investigation into the application
of market-based control to various aspects of telecommunications network
management. It is hoped eventually to extend the approach to design a network
management system for connection oriented packet switched technologies such as
asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) telecommunications networks.
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